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The outbreak of the Egyptian revolution in 2011 gave a huge impetus to the study of popular 
culture. In particular, scholars working in such diverse fields as anthropology, media studies, 
film studies, comparative literature and cultural studies have highlighted the flourishing of 
creativity and the role of popular culture in mobilizing and articulating popular resistance to 
authoritarianism and challenging state media narratives of events.1 Not only artists but also 
ordinary people used music, poetry, graffiti, jokes, and citizen journalism to document 
events, to tell their stories and express their viewpoints. Comedy and, in particular, political 
satire were used to criticize and ridicule the authorities. Citizen journalism became prominent 
in correcting the omissions or distortions of state-owned media and creating a revolutionary 
narrative. The figure of the martyr of the revolution (that is, those individuals who died at the 
hands of the security forces in political protests) was ubiquitous in various forms of popular 
culture and served to create public sympathy not merely for those individuals but, more 
importantly, for the cause of the revolution. The state was not the only object of criticism. 
Popular culture was also used to raise awareness of sexual violence against women 
protesters, which was perpetrated not only by the police and military but also by unknown 
gangs of men. Moreover, popular culture was not only expressive of resistance to dominant 
power. It was also an arena for pro-regime voices, such as the TV presenter Tawfiq `Ukasha, 
who used his show to whip up hostility to the revolution and support for the military.2 
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Yet, political scientists have largely ignored popular culture and its role in the 2010-2011 
uprisings. This reflects a general lack of attention to non-conventional forms of political 
agency alongside a narrow definition of what constitutes “the political” within the field of 
political science. Rather, in the wake of the Arab uprisings, political scientists have focused 
primarily on comparing structural or institutional factors or social movement dynamics to 
explain the outcomes of the 2011 uprisings across different country cases.3 As Jillian 
Schwedler argues, such approaches have obscured important micro-level as well as 
transnational processes. 4 In particular, these approaches are ill-suited to capturing the shifting 
subjectivities and identities and contested meanings of the revolution that underpinned post-
2011 political dynamics. I argue that in order to capture these important dynamics, it is 
necessary to study the processes of meaning-making embedded in everyday life. In other 
words, political scientists should study culture, but not as a reified system of beliefs or 
values, as pursued by orientalists and proponents of “political culture,” but rather, as Lisa 
Wedeen argues, as a social practice that gives meaning to politics.5 However, unlike Wedeen, 
I do not view culture as a “causal variable” that can explain political dynamics, such as 
individual compliance with authoritarian regimes or the reasons for violent conflict between 
ethnic groups.6 Rather, I view culture as constitutive of politics. By this, I mean that the 
construction of culture is intrinsically political because cultural meanings always exist in 
relation to power and, as Antonio Gramsci theorized, particular cultural meanings are crucial 
to the construction of hegemony for those who seek power.7  Such an understanding of the 
political is not merely interested in the direct expressions of politics within cultural 
production (for example, Rami `Issam singing ‘Irhal’) but also in the ways in which the 
meanings of the revolution were constructed and contested through representations of class, 
gender, and nation and their articulation with existing and emerging relations of power.    
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I argue that popular culture is a particularly productive site through which to understand the 
shifting meanings of the revolution and its aftermath for everyday Egyptians and how, in 
turn, this informed the unfolding political dynamics that led to the military coup of July 2013 
and the reestablishment of authoritarianism. Toward this end, between June 2016 and January 
2020, I was involved in a research project examining the relationship between politics and 
popular culture in the aftermath of the 25 January 2011 revolution.8 Any discussion of the 
study of popular culture should consider the lack of consensus over what it is.9 It is usually 
defined in terms of what it is not. As Walid Hamamsy and Mounira Soliman outline, popular 
culture in the Middle East and North Africa was long viewed as a lower form of cultural 
production, more superficial, consumerist and lacking substance vis-à-vis “high” culture, 
which was considered the more respected and canonized form of culture.10 The 
conceptualization of popular culture in Middle East studies is further complicated by the lack 
of a precise translation of the term into Arabic. “Al-thaqafa al-sha`biya” does not correspond 
with the definitions of popular culture in Anglophone scholarship. In Arabic, the meaning of 
“sha`bi,” the adjective of “al-sha`b,” “the people,” differs depending on the context and 
who is using it.  As James Grippo usefully summarizes, in discussing “sha`bi” music, ‘On 
one hand the word evokes a sense of asala, or “authenticity,” a value explicitly steeped in 
local Egyptian-ness. […] On the other hand, […] sha`bi is also potentially associated with the 
crowds of illiterate masses, backwards customs, and even vulgarity of speech and dress.’11  
 
Rather than trying to present a definition of popular culture that attempts to fix the boundaries 
between “high” and “low” or “authentic” and “alien” culture, it is more useful to understand 
these boundaries as constructed and contingent, shifting over time. Indeed, the liminal 
moment of the Egyptian revolution is particularly fruitful for revealing both the constructed 
nature of the term and its fluidity in relation to sociopolitical transformations. During this 
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period, artistic movements attempted to break down barriers between “elite” and “popular” 
culture. For example, El-Fann Midan movement, formed soon after the ousting of Mubarak, 
aimed to bring art and culture to the streets of Egypt in order to create political and cultural 
awareness.12 The monthly “street carnivals” hosted a mix of what would generally be 
considered “high” arts alongside performances of popular culture. Similarly, the annual 
Downtown Contemporary Arts Festival (D-CAF) has hosted a mix of performing arts, visual 
arts and films from both high and popular cultures in spaces across downtown Cairo. Unlike 
El-Fann Midan, not all of D-CAF’s events are free.  
 
Efforts to transform the meaning of popular culture were intrinsically linked to efforts to 
define the meaning of the revolution, at least on the part of some of its participants. Stuart 
Hall argued that the construction of the boundaries between popular and elite culture is a 
product of relations of power, supported through a ‘whole set of institutions and institutional 
processes.’13 Conversely, efforts to dismantle or shift those boundaries were part of the 
struggle to dismantle the hegemony of state cultural institutions, which had carefully policed 
these boundaries before 2011. Whereas “the popular” was previously derided as inferior, in 
the liminal context of the 2011 uprisings, with its famous slogan, “al-sha`b yurid isqat al-
nizam” (the people want the fall of the regime), the popular became elevated as the 
embodiment of revolutionary desire.14 All of a sudden, everyone defined themselves as with 
“the people.” The subversive potential of El-Fann Midan and other similar cultural initiatives 
lay not only in their attempts to reach a broader audience (the people) than the officially-
sponsored arts events of pre-2011, but also their reclaiming of public space from the state and 
its security apparatus. However, it is precisely this element that led El-Fann Midan to be 
denied a license to continue holding events after 2013, whilst D-CAF has also been gradually 
forced to scale back its program of performances in public spaces. 
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However, whilst some of these cultural initiatives positioned themselves against the regime 
and state hegemony over the cultural scene, nonetheless they were imbricated in wider 
relations of power that cannot be reduced to the people versus the regime. For example, the 
organizers of El-Fann Midan were motivated by the middle-class, modernizing sensibilities 
of Egyptian artists in terms of the “enlightening” role of culture for the masses.15 Such 
sensibilities were also apparent in the aesthetic preferences of middle-class protesters in 
2011.16 Hence, El-Fann Midan may also be understood as an effort to resignify the popular to 
include the middle classes and their aesthetic preferences in order to maintain or even reassert 
their political relevance and cultural power in a context of political, social and cultural 
upheaval and following decades of economic reforms that hollowed out the middle class. 
Meanwhile, D-CAF, which began in 2014, was the beneficiary of rather than an active 
participant in the opening up of public spaces and dismantling of aesthetic hierarchies in the 
post-2011 moment. It is an example of cultural entrepreneurship, in that particular aesthetics, 
associated with the revolutionary moment, were mobilized and commercialized in line with 
neoliberal logics as part of a broader neoliberal project of gentrification of downtown Cairo. 
In this regard, D-CAF has been criticized for its partnership with Ismaelia for Real Estate 
Investment, which has been buying up and gentrifying downtown buildings since 2008.17 
Hence, efforts to dismantle previously existing cultural boundaries and to valorize popular 
culture cannot be reduced to instances of resistance to regime hegemony but rather were 
implicated in the political competition over symbolic and material resources in post-2011 
Egypt by different class fractions.   
 
Hence, whilst there has often been a tendency in the scholarly literature to view popular 
culture as a form of resistance to hegemony, particularly in the context of the Egyptian 
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revolution, the politics of popular culture are more complex and contradictory. An interesting 
example of this is mahragan or “festival”  music, which emerged in economically 
marginalized Cairo neighborhoods, such as al-Matariyya, blending electronic dance and 
sha`bi music styles.18 It has been regarded as a form of resistance to the political and 
socioeconomic marginalization of these neighborhoods in urban Egypt.19 Whilst this music 
long predates the revolution, emerging around 2007, nonetheless, it became widely listened 
to after the revolution, far beyond the neighborhoods in which it is produced, and was often a 
feature of the cultural events discussed above. The lyrics of this music are primarily 
concerned with the everyday concerns of those living in these communities, rather than the 
big political slogans of the revolution. Indeed, mahraganat musicians have tended to distance 
themselves from politics.20 Nonetheless, through their representation of the everyday 
concerns of this group of people, these songs produce a politics that does not seek to 
challenge power directly but rather to carve out an autonomous sphere in which the dominant 
cultural meanings underpinning hierarchies of power may be disrupted. For example, in the 
song, ‘The People Want LE5 Phone Credit,’ (‘Al-sha`b yurid khamsa gineh rasid’) 
mahraganat musicians MC Sadat El Alamy and Alaa Fifty Cent appropriate a key slogan of 
the 18 days and subvert it with reference to an everyday, material concern. By questioning 
whether “the people” seeking to topple the regime are the same as “the people” who are 
“tired,” that is, the working classes and residents of the marginalized communities from 
where the musicians originate, the song disrupts celebratory representations of a unified 
Egyptian people and draws attention to the existence of different class interests.21 However, 
mahraganat song lyrics have also been criticized for their problematic representations of 
gender relations, portraying young women as immoral, sexual temptresses and denigrating 
their appearance and behavior.22 It is possible to contend that mahraganat, like popular 
culture more broadly, is a mix of dominant and oppositional cultural and ideological values.23 
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Yet, I argue, that such an approach ignores the ways in which particular forms of masculinity 
may be bound up with resistance. It is precisely the socioeconomic and political exclusion 
and prevalent state security surveillance faced by young working-class men that shapes the 
performance of what could be considered alternative masculinities. Working-class male 
youth reclaim the urban public spaces within which they are marginalized through their 
“voluble listening practices.”24 Meanwhile, they compensate for their “injured masculinity” 
through the surveillance and policing of sexuality and gender behavior of the neighborhood’s 
women, particularly young women,  as revealed in Salwa Ismail’s study of the informal 
neighborhood of Bulaq al-Dakrur.25 In other words, the cultural politics of mahraganat 
illustrate the need for a more nuanced conceptualization of the relationship between popular 
culture and politics that goes beyond binary notions of resistance/domination to understand 
the ways in which different vectors of social inequality and hierarchies interact in 
contradictory ways. 
 
Contestations over the definition the boundaries of the popular in popular culture are 
intrinsically linked to defining who constitutes “the people” and what do they want. This is 
clear in the example of the ‘The People Want LE5 phone credit.’ Definitions of the people 
shifted over time as the post-Mubarak transition unfolded and were intimately bound up with 
struggles over the nature of the emerging political order. The construction of “al-sha`b al-
Masri” within popular culture took on an increasingly exclusivist characteristic as the 
political scene became more polarized, particularly after the election the late Mohamed 
Morsi. For example, comedian Bassem Youssef increased his viewership during the period of 
MB rule as he became known for his particularly scathing depictions of the Brotherhood, 
deploying long-standing anti-Muslim Brotherhood prejudices (that members of the group are 
“backward,” whilst the leaders are treacherous) in his criticisms of the government. Similarly, 
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`Ali al-Haggar’s ‘Ihna sha`b wa intu sha`b,’ (‘We are one people and you are another 
people’) released in the summer of 2013, celebrated the military coup and demonized the 
Muslim Brotherhood as literally not part of the Egyptian people, also drawing on well-known 
anti-Brotherhood tropes.26 Of course, the widespread opposition of artists and cultural figures 
to the Muslim Brotherhood was also motivated by the attempts of Morsi’s government to 
establish hegemony over the cultural scene. Yet, the representation of the Muslim 
Brotherhood as being fundamentally culturally different served to position the organization as 
outside of the boundaries of the Egyptian people, demonizing it and normalizing the 
unprecedented state violence perpetrated against their supporters after July 2013, culminating 
in the massacres of Rabi`a and al-Nahda Squares on 14 August 2013.27 Presciently, the 
cartoonist Andeel satirized the celebration and justification of anti-Brotherhood violence in 
his “Picture to remember the happiness of the great Egyptian people,” published in July 
2013.28  
 
Identifying the struggles over the meanings of the popular and the people in popular culture 
provides a more complex insight into the dynamics of the Egyptian revolution and its 
aftermath. It enables us to go beyond binaries of resistance versus domination, or the people 
versus the regime, highlighting the often-contradictory ways in which popular culture and the 
people were positioned in relation to power. Specifically, it is important to look beyond the 
direct political messages that may be part of cultural production and, instead, to pay attention 
to the representations of class, gender and nation and how these are positioned in relation to 
hegemonic meanings and existing and emerging relations of power.  Moreover, rather than 
treating popular culture as a set of artefacts, it is more useful to view it as a terrain of 
struggle, in which even the definitions of popular culture and the popular are intrinsic to 
battles for power. In this way, popular culture is a crucial lens through which to rethink the 
 9 
political, beyond formal political institutions and processes to include the everyday struggle 
over cultural meanings that are constitutive of power relations. In a revolutionary context in 
which there were new opportunities to challenge existing boundaries and categories and resist 
previously hegemonic cultural meanings, the political significance of popular culture was 
arguably amplified. Nonetheless, the ongoing political significance of popular culture is also 
demonstrated by the efforts of the Sisi regime to censor popular culture and to dominate its 
production, particularly in relation to Ramadan TV series.   
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